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Abstract This paper analyses the formation and stability of coalitions to form international
environmental agreements. We present and apply the Stability of coalitions model to assess
the internal and external stability of all possible coalition structures in a cartel formation game;
first under the assumption that no transfers take place and second for a transfer scheme. One
important novelty of this paper is the analysis of the incentive structure of twelve regions
for all possible combinations of (cartel) coalitions in an empirical setting with asymmetric
regions. We show that stable coalitions can emerge only if benefits from global abatement
are sufficiently high or if an appropriate transfer scheme is introduced.
Keywords International environmental agreements · Kyoto-Protocol · Cartel formation ·
Stability of coalitions · Non-cooperative game theory
JEL Classification Numbers C72 · H41 · Q25
1. Introduction
An important topic in environmental economics is how to reach agreements on environ-
mental policies. This does not only apply to local, regional and national problems but also
to transboundary problems (like acid rain), and global problems (like climate change). For
many local, regional and national problems, solutions have been introduced based on public
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decision making on environmental standards or policy goals, and the ways and means to reach
them. For international problems, like the problem of global warming, serious problems arise
because a supra-national body for governance and decision making that can impose binding
rules for the policies to be implemented (including monitoring of compliance and enforce-
ment) is not available, and we therefore have to rely on voluntary international agreements.
Greenhouse gases have accumulated in the atmosphere for centuries and the decay of
most greenhouse gases takes at least 50 years. Countries continue to emit greenhouse gases
and the global warming problem will persist for at least the next century. Consequently, it
is important to design efficient long-term climate policies in an international setting. This
implies that a detailed understanding of the incentives that countries and regions have to
cooperate is of utmost importance.
Two game theoretical approaches of the formation of international environmental agree-
ments (IEAs) have stressed the difficulties of designing self-enforcing treaties because of free-
riding. The cooperative approach has focused on transfer schemes ensuring stability of the
efficient grand coalition implementing socially optimal abatement levels (e.g., Chander and
Tulkens 1995, 1997; Germain et al. 2003).1 Empirical studies include Eyckmans and Tulkens
(2003), Germain et al. (2003) and Kaitala et al. (1995). The non-cooperative approach that
we follow in this paper has focused on explaining the problems of forming large and effective
coalitions. A coalition is internally stable if no coalition member has an incentive to leave
the coalition to become a singleton and externally stable if no singleton has an incentive
to join the coalition.2 Key results that emerge from this literature (e.g., Barrett 1994, 1997,
Bauer 1992, Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, Hoel 1992, Hoel and Schneider 1997, Jeppesen
and Andersen 1998 and Rubio and Ulph 2001) are: (a) only small coalitions are stable and
(b) whenever full cooperation (social optimum) would generate large global welfare gains
compared to no cooperation (Nash equilibrium), stable coalitions achieve only little.
The non-cooperative approach helps to explain the problems of cooperation in interna-
tional pollution control and most results in the literature rely on simulations and have been
derived for very specific assumptions, such as a static payoff structure and/or symmetric
players. There are only few empirical studies and most are simplified either on the dynam-
ics (e.g., Botteon and Carraro 1997, 1998; Tol 2001) or on the regional disaggregation of
the climate problem (i.e., number of players; e.g., Bosello et al. 2003; Buchner et al. 2002;
Eyckmans and Finus 2003).
The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate the incentive structure of world regions
in the negotiations on an international climate agreement. For this, we analyze the forma-
tion and stability of possible coalition structures in a cartel formation game and discuss
some policy implications of our results. The paper tries to answer the following questions
in particular: How much emission reduction would occur if countries do not cooperate in an
international agreement? Would a coalition of industrialized countries be stable? What are
the global gains of full cooperation in the grand coalition and will this coalition be stable?
Do transfer mechanisms contribute to the formation of larger stable coalitions?
Our paper adds to the tradition of empirical studies based on the non-cooperative approach
in several ways. First, our model captures some important features of the dynamic nature
of greenhouse gas accumulation by including the accumulation of greenhouse gases over a
period of hundred years under stationary abatement strategies. Second, the effect of hetero-
1 For an overview, see Finus (2001, 2003a). A more general discussion of cooperative and non-cooperative
coalition theory is provided in Bloch (1997).
2 Recent advances in non-cooperative coalition theory are discussed in Bloch (1997) and Yi (1997). Appli-
cations in the context of IEAs are found in Finus (2003b) and Finus and Rundshagen (2003a,b)
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geneity for coalition formation is expressed by estimated abatement costs and damage costs
of climate change based on well-known sources. Third, the analysis comprises twelve world
regions that render the interactions between actors more interesting than studies that consider
fewer regions. In this paper, we limit ourselves to cartel coalitions, i.e., we only allow for
one coalition.3
In the following, we lay out the building blocks of the model in section 2. In section 3,
we discuss the environmental and economic implications of coalition formation for our base
case. Section 4 provides a sensitivity analysis and includes results on introducing monetary
transfers. Section 5 summarizes the main findings and concludes with a discussion of policy
implications. Details on the calibration of the model can be found in the Appendix.
2. Description of the main structure of STACO
2.1. Description of the game
In the STAbility of COalitions model (STACO) that we employ, coalition formation is mod-
eled as a two-stage game (Bloch 1997). In the ﬁrst stage, countries or regions4 decide on their
membership in a coalition; in the second stage, coalition members choose their abatement
strategies.
In the ﬁrst stage, we assume that there are two membership strategies available to regions:
“I do not want to sign the agreement” and “I want to become a member of the climate treaty”.
Technically, this implies that regions that announce not to sign become a singleton and those
that announce to sign become a member of a cartel coalition. For 12 world regions, this gives
rise to 4084 different coalition structures.
In the second stage, regions choose their abatement strategies based on the following
payoff function for each region i, i = 1, . . . , N :5
πi (q) =
T∑
t=1
(1 + ri )−t (Bit (qt ) − ACi t (qit )), (1)
where T denotes the time horizon, t = 1, 2, . . . , T, ri is the discount rate of country i, Bit
are benefits from global abatement qt = ∑Ni=1 qit , ACi t are abatement costs from individual
abatement qit and q is an abatement matrix of dimension N ×T . Benefits from global abate-
ment are derived from reduced environmental damages caused by greenhouse gas emissions.
(Details on the calibration of the payoff function are given in the Appendix.)
Following the literature (cf. Bloch 1997), we assume that the coalition and single regions
play a Nash equilibrium in terms of abatement strategies. This has also be called a partial
3 This assumption is in line with the observation that all existing IEAs are single coalition agreements.
Nevertheless, recent approaches in coalition theory have investigated the theoretical possibility of multiple
coalitions (see the reference cited in footnote 2 and additionally Bosello et al. 2003; Eyckmans and Finus
2003 for instance). The main finding is that if coalition formation is not restricted to a single coalition, coali-
tion structures with multiple coalitions may well emerge in equilibrium that may perform better than single
coalitions in terms of global welfare and global abatement. However, the results are not innocuous in terms of
real world interpretations as explained for instance in Finus (2003a).
4 In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to “regions”.
5 We make the standard assumptions: ∀i ∈ I, qit ∈ [0, eBAUi t ] and at each time t: B′i t > 0, B′′i t ≤ 0, AC′i t > 0,
and AC′′i t > 0, where primes denote derivatives and eBAUi t is the emission level in the business-as-usual
scenario (BAU). Our calibration of these functions results in a unique interior solution for optimal abatement
levels.
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Nash equilibrium between the coalition and single regions by Chander and Tulkens (1997).
That is, non-signatories choose their abatement strategies such as to maximize their own
payoff, taking the abatement strategies of all other regions as given. Signatories choose their
abatement such as to maximize the aggregate payoff to their coalition, taking the abatement
strategies of all outsiders as given. Consequently, the “All Singletons Coalition Structure”,
where none of the regions signs the agreement, implies an equilibrium abatement strategy
vector corresponding to the “classical” Nash equilibrium; similarly, the “Grand Coalition
Structure”, where all regions are member of the coalition, reflects the “classical” social opti-
mum. The highest global welfare will be obtained in the Grand Coalition Structure.
We call a coalition structure c∗ stable if no country has an incentive to change its mem-
bership strategy, given the strategies of all other regions. This corresponds to the definition
of internal stability and external stability mentioned in the Section 1.
For the dynamic aspects of the model we note the following. The STACO model con-
siders a time period of 100 years in which emissions of the various regions will increase
under business as usual when no emission reduction occurs. Regions decide on the basis
of the discounted net benefits over this period by which percentage they will reduce their
emissions as compared to the base year level for 2010. In order to simplify the analysis, we
impose that this emission reduction percentage remains stable for the entire time period. Net
benefits of each region depend on the abatement cost and the benefits of reduced damages of
climate change. These damages are calculated on the basis of the accumulation of greenhouse
gases, the resulting temperature change and the expected impacts on the various regions in
the world. We consider this specification to be useful because we are primarily interested in
the overall impact of the long-term stationary abatement policies of regions. To this end, an
analysis of the net present value of the discounted stream of future pay-offs from stationary
abatement strategies suffices.6
Though we do not pay special attention to the policy instruments that should be used to
implement the IEA at a regional level (i.e., whether the policies are implemented by means
of carbon taxes or tradable permits or direct regulation), our calculation of the optimal allo-
cation of abatement efforts implicitly assumes that an efficient policy instrument, such as
tradable permits or carbon taxes, is implemented within the coalition to achieve the targets
formulated in the agreement. Similarly, efficient policy instruments are implicitly underlying
the singletons behavior. In this context, it is important to note that we assume initially in our
analysis that no transfers take place between members of the coalition, and that no transfers
occur between other regions. In section 4 on sensitivity analysis and transfers, we will include
a transfer mechanism.
2.2. Calibration of the model
In this section, we describe payoff functions (1) and their constituting elements. Our analysis
takes 2010 as the base year and covers a period of 100 years (2011–2110) in order to capture
the long-run effects of the global warming problem.
The philosophy behind the construction of our empirical model comprises two items.
First, the model must be simple enough to be tractable for a game theoretical analysis and
it should reflect important results and features of optimal growth models in terms of the
development of global emissions and concentration of greenhouse gases over the relevant
period. Therefore, we base our calibration of global emissions, the stock of greenhouse gases
6 We acknowledge that the path of abatement influences the outcomes of the model, as earlier abatement
implies lower future damages. This strengthens the importance of carrying out a sensitivity analysis on the
level of (future) damages.
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Table 1 Emissions, benefit and abatement cost parameters
Regions Emissions
in 2010 (Gton) Share of global benefits Abatement cost parameter
si αi βi
Calibration I Calibration II
USA 2.42 0.226 0.124 0.0005 0.00398
JPN 0.56 0.173 0.114 0.0155 0.18160
EEC 1.4 0.236 0.064 0.0024 0.01503
OOE 0.62 0.035 0.017 0.0083 0
EET 0.51 0.013 0.013 0.0079 0.00486
FSU 1 0.068 0.035 0.0023 0.00042
EEX 1.22 0.030 0.030 0.0032 0.03029
CHN 2.36 0.062 0.062 0.00007 0.00239
IND 0.63 0.050 0.171 0.0015 0.00787
DAE 0.41 0.025 0.085 0.0047 0.03774
BRA 0.13 0.015 0.052 0.5612 0.84974
ROW 0.7 0.068 0.233 0.0021 0.00805
World 11.96
∑
si = 1
∑
si = 1
and resulting temperature change on the widely known DICE-model by Nordhaus (1994).
Second, our model uses the most disaggregate data currently available for accuracy but also
to render the strategic interaction between regions (i.e., players) interesting. This implies
that in our model the world is divided into 12 regions: USA (USA), Japan (JPN), European
Union (EEC), Other OECD countries (OOE), Central and Eastern European countries (EET),
Former Soviet Union (FSU), Energy exporting countries (EEX), China (CHN), India (IND),
Dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil (BRA), and “Rest of the world” (ROW).7
For the calibration of the model, we rely on damage cost estimates of Fankhauser (1995)
and Tol (1997) and abatement cost estimates of Ellerman and Decaux (1998). Global dam-
ages are calibrated to equal 2.7% of GDP when a doubling of CO2 concentrations occurs.
Regional shares in total benefits are displayed in Table 1, together with the parameter values
of the abatement cost functions (recalibrated to reflect our model horizon, see Appendix).
For reference, we also include expected regional emissions in 2010 in this table.
Marginal abatement cost functions are graphically represented in Figure 1. From the graph,
it is evident that CHN and USA have the flattest curves while BRA and JPN have the steepest.
Combining the information on abatement costs and benefits, it can easily be conjectured that
as the USA has relatively low abatement costs and high damages, the regional payoff from
abatement is higher than in other regions. BRA that is facing high abatement costs and a
relatively low share in global damages has small incentives to reduce emissions.
Together with the payoff functions and the functions that describe the accumulation of
greenhouse gases and concentrations, the benefit and abatement cost functions constitute the
empirical part of STACO.
Though STACO captures important dynamic aspects of climate change, it is de facto a
one-shot game because of stationary abatement strategies (i.e., the emission reduction per-
centage for a region once it has been chosen, remains constant over the full time period).
7 EEC comprises the 15 countries of the European Union as of 1995. OOE includes among other countries
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. EET includes for instance Hungary, Poland, and Czech Republic. EEX
includes for example the Middle East Countries, Mexico, Venezuela and Indonesia. DAE comprises South
Korea, Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore. ROW includes for instance South Africa, Morocco and many
countries in Latin America and Asia. (For details, see Babiker et al. 2001.)
276 Economics of Governance (2006) 7:271–291
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240
Q (Gton)
di
sc
ou
nt
ed
 M
A
C 
(bl
n $
/G
ton
 = 
$/t
on
)
Max. 132 Gton at 4564 $/ton
BRA
JPN
OOE
EET
DAE
EEX
EEC
FSU
ROW
IND
USA
CHN
Fig. 1 Discounted marginal abatement cost functions
We choose this specification to simplify the model structure. This simplification seems to be
justified because we also assume that the decision to join a coalition or to remain a singleton is
based on discounted payoffs. Hence, only aggregate magnitudes matter in our simple model
which are very close to more sophisticated models (see also footnote 6). In other words, in
our analysis, we focus on the stability of coalition structures, not on detailed predictions of
economic growth and welfare in the various regions. The calibration on the basis of the DICE
model and the EPPA model ensures that the model mimics larger models on the focal issues
of the stock of GHGs, abatement costs and benefits.
The value of the discount rate cannot be taken from data. The discount rate is assumed
to be 2%, which implies that future costs and damages get more emphasis than under higher
discount rates. A sensitivity analysis would allow to analyze the impact of different levels of
the discount rate, but that is not the primary focus of our paper.
Details of the calibration of the STACO model are given in the Appendix, including the
development of concentrations of greenhouse gases, the regional benefit and abatement cost
functions and all parameter values; a more detailed description of the model and details on
the calibration procedure are available from Dellink et al. (2003).
2.3. Some basic implications of the model
For the incentive structure of regions, our payoff functions imply the following, assuming
Calibration I in the following illustration.8 First, in any coalition, the flatter a country’s
marginal abatement cost curve, the higher will be its contribution to joint abatement. Thus,
we expect that USA, CHN and ROW will carry a relatively large portion of joint abate-
ment whereas BRA and JPN will carry a low portion. Second, the individual contribution
of a country will rise with the number of coalition members with high marginal benefits
8 Note that these characteristics of the payoff function depend crucially on the calibrated parameter values
of the benefit and abatement cost functions. Hence, the implications on a regional level will vary between
Calibrations I and II.
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(i.e., high regional shares si). Hence, other things being equal, if USA, JPN and the EEC are
members of a coalition, this will require higher abatement efforts of individual regions than
if for instance EEX, BRA and Dynamic Asian countries are members of a coalition. Third,
and trivially, regions with high marginal benefits benefit more from cooperation in terms of
reduced damages than those with low marginal benefits. Fourth, as a tendency, regions with
relatively high marginal benefits and relatively steep marginal abatement cost curves, like for
instance JPN and the EEC, will receive in the absence of transfers a high share from the gains
from cooperation where the opposite holds for regions with relatively low marginal benefits
and flat marginal abatement cost curves like CHN and EET. It is not unrealistic that large
abatement efforts are undertaken in developing countries such as CHN, and only little is done
in countries such as JPN. The question is, however, who will bear the financial burden for
these efforts? It seems likely that in an international climate agreement some compensation
payments will become available. Though these are not commonplace in existing IEAs, they
are likely to become more popular. The Kyoto Protocol contains several so-called flexible
mechanisms for international compensations, including tradable permits, Joint Implementa-
tion and the Clean Development Mechanism. These transfers are not included in the analysis
and the results that we present in section 3, but will be analyzed using an extended model
version in section 4.
3. Results: base case
3.1. Introduction
In order to understand the incentive structure for regions, we start by considering the charac-
teristics of a set of three coalition structures in terms of emission reduction, cost and benefits
and net discounted payoff for the various regions. In our base case, we use a global benefit
parameter γD = 0.027 as in Tol (1997), regional benefit shares of Calibration I, and abate-
ment parameters as listed in Table 1, subsection 2.2. We discuss first the characteristics of
three “benchmark coalition structures”: (1) The “All Singletons Coalition Structure” with
no cooperation (subsection 3.2). (2) The “Grand Coalition Structure” with full cooperation
(subsection 3.3). (3) The “Industrialized Countries Coalition Structure” as an example of
partial cooperation (subsection 3.4). In the latter, we assume that the industrialized coun-
tries USA, JPN, EEC, OOE, EET and FSU form a coalition. Subsequently, we report on the
incentive structure and the stability of all possible coalition structures (subsection 3.5).
3.2. All Singletons Coalition Structure
Table 2 reports results if each region acts as a singleton and no coalition is established.
This corresponds to the “classical” Nash equilibrium with no cooperation. Hence, for each
country marginal abatement costs are equated to marginal benefits. Annual global emission
reduction amounts to only 4.6% which implies a stock of carbon dioxide of 1,561 Gton of
CO2 in 2110. This is about 2.5 times the pre-industrial level. The fact that for the ﬁrst tons of
abatement benefits are higher than the costs of abatement explains that even in the absence
of any cooperation total emission reductions equal 55 Gton.
At the level of individual regions, it is evident that annual emission reductions vary widely.
The reason is large differences between regions in marginal abatement cost curves (see Fig-
ure 1 and Table 1) and marginal benefits from abatement (see Table 1). Even in the absence
of cooperation, USA has an incentive to annually reduce emissions by 16 Gton; similarly,
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Table 2 All Singletons Coalition Structure
Regions Total Annual Total Total benefits Payoff Marginal Marginal
emission emission abatement from abatement benefits
reduction reduction costs abatement costs
Gton (over percentage of billion US$ billion US$ billion US$ US$/ton US$/ton
100 years) emissions in over 100 over 100 over 100
2010 years years years
USA 16 6.7 53 468 415 8.5 8.5
JPN 1 1.4 2 357 354 6.5 6.5
EEC 7 4.7 24 488 464 8.8 8.8
OOE 2 3.1 1 71 71 1.3 1.3
EET 1 1.8 0 27 27 0.5 0.5
FSU 5 4.9 4 140 135 2.5 2.5
EEX 1 0.7 0 62 62 1.1 1.1
CHN 15 6.6 16 128 112 2.3 2.3
IND 3 5.3 3 103 101 1.9 1.9
DAE 1 1.3 0 52 51 0.9 0.9
BRA 0 0.1 0 32 32 0.6 0.6
ROW 4 5.3 4 141 137 2.5 2.5
World 55 4.6 109 2,069 1,960
Global stock of carbon dioxide in 2110 equals 1,561 Gton
the low marginal abatement costs of CHN imply relatively large incentives to abate unilater-
ally. In contrast, regions like BRA, the Dynamic Asian countries and the EEX have virtually
no incentive at all to conduct emission reductions by themselves because of steep marginal
abatement cost curves and low marginal benefits from abatement. Overall, it is evident that
marginal benefits and costs remain at a moderate level.
3.3. Grand Coalition Structure
Table 3 displays results for the Grand Coalition Structure that corresponds to the “classical”
global or social optimum with full cooperation. Thus, marginal abatement costs are equal
across regions and amount to 37.4 US$/ton – a value that is in the range of many other empir-
ical studies (e.g., Weyant 1999). At the aggregate level, annual emission reduction amounts
to 21.4%, exceeding those in the All Singletons Case by a substantial amount. However, not
total emissions implied by emission reductions from BAU-emission are important for dam-
ages and hence for the benefits from emission reduction but greenhouse gas concentration.
Here we find that the difference in concentration in 2110 is more moderate and amounts to
a reduction of only 5.5% compared to the All Singletons Case. This is a feature reminiscent
also to most integrated assessment models. The reason is that the airborne fraction of CO2-
emissions that remains in the atmosphere is only 64% and the annual natural removal rate
of 0.86% levels off differences between both cases over a period of 100 years. However, the
total payoff (benefits minus abatement costs) in the Grand Coalition Structure is 6,031 billion
US$, more than 3 times the level in the All Singletons Coalition Structure, which implies
substantial gains from cooperation. This stresses the importance of cooperation in the case
of global warming.
It is evident that USA and CHN have to contribute substantially more than other regions
to a globally optimal solution due to their flat marginal abatement cost curves. For EET and
CHN a globally optimal solution would not be profitable, as is indicated by bold faced fig-
ures in column 6, Table 3. Those regions have to contribute much to cooperation but benefit
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Table 3 Grand Coalition Structure
Regions Total Annual Total Total Payoff Marginal Marginal Incentive
emission emission abatement benefits abatement benefits to leave
reduction reduction costs from costs coalition
abatement
Gton percentage billion US$ billion US$ billion US$ US$/ton US$/ton billion US$
(over 100 of over 100 over 100 over 100 over 100
years) emissions years years years years
in 2010
USA a 38 15.7 513 2,169 1,656 37.4 8.5 23.6
JPN a 4 6.5 63 1,653 1,590 37.4 6.5 −123.8
EEC a 16 11.5 229 2,262 2,033 37.4 8.8 −180.1
OOE a 10 16.5 127 331 203 37.4 1.3 109.6
EET a 10 19.6 130 125 −6 37.4 0.5 124.9
FSU a 19 19.3 242 647 405 37.4 2.5 178.1
EEX a 12 10.2 188 288 99 37.4 1.1 169.9
CHN a 96 40.6 1,348 594 −754 37.4 2.3 1133.2
IND a 22 33.8 295 479 184 37.4 1.9 245.8
DAE a 10 25.1 155 239 84 37.4 0.9 142.1
BRA a 1 5.5 12 147 135 37.4 0.6 10.0
ROW a 19 26.5 250 652 401 37.4 2.5 185.1
World 256 21.4 3,553 9,584 6,031
Global stock of carbon dioxide in 2110 equals 1,475 Gton
a indicates that the region is a coalition member
only little in the form of reduced damages. Thus, we can immediately conclude that without
transfers the Grand Coalition cannot be a stable coalition structure.
The last column of Table 3 shows the absolute amount of the gains from leaving the grand
coalition, based on single deviations. For example, if the USA were to leave the Grand Coa-
lition, but the other 11 regions were to remain, the payoff to USA would increase with almost
24 bln US$, almost 1.5% of their total payoff. For most regions, these free-rider gains are very
high, sometimes even larger than their payoff, indicating a strong free-rider incentive. Only
JPN and the EEC have no interest in leaving the Grand Coalition. As these two regions have
high marginal benefits from abatement, they have the highest interest in full cooperation,
and – as will be apparent below – also in partial cooperation. A detailed explanation of the
underlying mechanisms will be provided below where we report on our stability analysis
(subsection 3.5).
3.4. Industrialized Countries Coalition Structure
Table 4 displays results for the Industrialized Countries Coalition Structure. The first six
regions (indicated in italics in Table 4) jointly maximize the aggregate payoff to their coali-
tion and therefore marginal abatement costs of these regions are equal. Annual abatement is
substantially lower than in the Grand Coalition Structure but almost twice as high as in the All
Singletons Coalition Structure. Also, the net benefits of climate policies (3140 billion US$)
is 60% higher than without cooperation, showing smaller gains from partial cooperation than
from global cooperation.
However, also the Industrialized Countries Coalition Structure is not stable. Three regions,
i.e., OOE, EET and FSU, would be worse off in this coalition than if they would leave and
they actually have a lower payoff than in the All Singleton Coalition Structure (as indicated
by bold faced numbers in Table 4, column 5). Moreover, not only these regions but also the
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Table 4 Industrialized Countries Coalition Structure
Regions Total Annual Total Total Payoff Marginal Marginal Incentive
emission emission abatement benefits abatement benefits to change
reduction reduction costs from costs member-
abatement ship
strategy
Gton (over Percentage billion US$ billion US$ billion US$ US$/ton US$/ton billion US$
100 of over 100 over 100 over 100 over 100
years) emissions years years years years
in 2010
U SAa 32 13.4 332 906 574 28.0 8.5 65.3
J PN a 3 5.2 38 691 653 28.0 6.5 −46.9
EECa 14 9.7 147 945 798 28.0 8.8 −52.8
OOEa 9 14.3 83 138 55 28.0 1.3 70.5
EET a 9 16.9 85 52 −33 28.0 0.5 80.3
FSU a 17 16.7 157 270 113 28.0 2.5 114.6
EEX 1 0.7 0 120 120 1.1 1.1 −113.5
CHN 15 6.6 16 248 232 2.3 2.3 −794.9
IND 3 5.3 3 200 197 1.9 1.9 −172.7
DAE 1 1.3 0 100 99 0.9 0.9 −93.9
BRA 0 0.1 0 61 61 0.6 0.6 −6.5
ROW 4 5.3 4 272 268 2.5 2.5 −137.8
World 107 8.9 865 4,005 3,140
Global stock of carbon dioxide in 2110 equals 1,539 Gton
a indicates that the region is a coalition member
USA have an incentive to leave the coalition, as it is evident from the last column in Table 4.9
Thus, in this respect, our results illustrate the difficulties of ratifying a coalition in which
industrialized countries agree on emission reduction targets, like the Kyoto protocol, but
we emphasize that the rules in the Kyoto protocol on CDM and joint implementation make
the Kyoto Protocol much more complex than our setting where no transfers or cooperation
outside the coalition is considered. Nevertheless, our results may give an intuition for the
decision of President Bush to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol and his announcement to
pursue, nevertheless, an “active” national climate policy by recalling our finding that the
USA will already conduct relative large emission reductions without any cooperation (see
Table 2).
Not surprising, all six outsiders are better off than in the All Singletons Coalition Structure
since they benefit from the abatement efforts of the Industrialized Countries Coalition. The
fact that none of the outsiders has an incentive to join the coalition is more surprising, which
follows from the negative number in the last column in Table 4. The reason is that if already
six regions have formed a coalition, joining would imply a substantial increase of abatement
efforts for a potential entrant but only a marginal additional benefit from reduced emissions.
The finding explains at least partially why it has proven so difficult to encourage developing
countries to participate in the Kyoto protocol as advocated in particular by the USA.
9 Our finding that the Industrialized Countries Coalition Structure is not profitable for some participants, and
hence also not stable, is confirmed by Bosello et al. (2003) in the context of the Kyoto Protocol.
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3.5. Stability analysis
We checked all 4,083 non-trivial coalition structures for internal and external stability with
an algorithm programmed with the software package Matlab.10 We found that there is no
coalition structure that is both internally and externally stable, under the setting that no trans-
fers are considered. Whereas more than 1,000 coalition structures are externally stable, only
14 coalition structures are internally stable; these are reported in Table 5. All these internally
stable coalitions are characterized by low emission reductions and very small gains from
cooperation. In all cases, the USA, JPN and the EEC want to join these small internally
stable coalitions, making these coalitions externally unstable and hence unstable. This can
easily be explained by the high damages in these three regions, which imply large gains from
joining a coalition. Consequently, it emerges that the desire of these regions for a stricter
climate policy provides an incentive for these regions to join existing small coalitions and
hence undermines the stability of these small coalitions. This may seem paradox. Here it is
not only the incentive to leave a coalition that undermines stability but also the incentive to
join a coalition by “new members”: joining means that the enlarged coalition will implement
more ambitious abatement targets making it internally unstable for the “old members”.
At the other end of the spectrum there are the EET and CHN, which do not want to join any
of these internally stable coalitions (except when CHN is already part of the coalition). The
incentive structure for EET is such that they have relatively steep marginal abatement costs
and very low benefits; especially the low benefits make joining the coalitions unattractive for
this region. For CHN, the incentive to stay outside these coalitions can best be explained by
the flat marginal abatement costs: if CHN enters a coalition, she would have to agree upon
large emission reductions (as this is efficient from a coalitional perspective). This result could
be changed when transfer schemes are implemented so that abatement activities in CHN can
be funded by other regions.
It is clear that the main problem for cooperation is a lack of internal stability because of
strong free-rider incentives. The incentive of a region to join a coalition firstly depends on
its contribution to joint abatement, as reflected by its marginal abatement cost curve. The
higher the contribution, the higher the incentive to free-ride will be. Secondly, the incentive
of a country to join a coalition in terms of its individual benefits from joint abatement is
directly linked to its regional share of global benefits si . The smaller this value, the less a
region benefits from joint abatement and hence the smaller the incentive to cooperate will
be. However, not only the absolute values of the free-rider incentives matter, but even more
important is the relative difference between regions: only regions with a similar incentive
structure form internally stable coalitions.
Though USA, JPN and the EEC have relatively low free-rider incentives, they are not
members of any internally stable coalition.11 All three regions have an incentive to cooperate
10 There exist N2 combinations (i.e., vectors) of announcements whether to join the agreement or not (see
section 2). With N = 12 regions, this gives 4,096 different announcement vectors. Since there are N announce-
ment vectors where only one region announces to become a member of the agreement and one announcement
vector where no region announces to be a member, which all lead to the “All singleton coalition structure”,
there are N2 − N , i.e., 4,084 different coalition structures and hence 4,083 non-trivial coalition structures.
A non-trivial coalition structure means a coalition structure with a coalition with at least two members. In the
following, we concentrate in the stability analysis on these coalition structures since the singleton coalition
structure is stable by definition. (By construction, if all regions announce not to become a member, a single
change of an announcement cannot make a difference).
11 The USA would like to leave the coalition with JPN and the EEC, as the high damages, especially in the
EEC, and relatively low marginal abatement costs in the USA imply high abatement percentages for the USA
in this coalition (more than 12%).
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Table 5 Internally stable coalitions
Coalitions Global emission Annual Global payoff Regions with incentive to join
reduction emission
reduction
Gton (over 100 percentage billion US$
years) of emissions over 100
in 2010 years
All Singletons 55 4.63 1,960 –
OOE, EEX 57 4.75 2,013 USA, JPN, EEC, FSU, IND,
BRA, ROW
EEX, CHN 62 5.18 2,190 USA, JPN, EEC, OOE, FSU,
IND, DAE, BRA, ROW
OOE, IND 58 4.84 2,050 USA, JPN, EEC, FSU, BRA,
ROW
EEX, IND 58 4.83 2,045 USA, JPN, EEC, OOE, FSU,
BRA, ROW
OOE, DAE 57 4.73 2,005 USA, JPN, EEC, FSU,
BRA, ROW
EEX, DAE 56 4.72 2,002 USA, JPN, EEC, OOE, FSU, IND
IND, BRA, ROW
CHN, DAE 61 5.09 2,153 USA, JPN, EEC, OOE, FSU,
EEX, IND, BRA, ROW
IND, DAE 57 4.79 2,032 USA, JPN, EEC, OOE, FSU,
BRA, ROW
FSU, BRA 56 4.68 1,981 USA, JPN, EEC, ROW
OOE, IND, BRA 59 4.92 2,081 USA, JPN, EEC, FSU, ROW
FSU, ROW 60 4.98 2,101 USA, JPN, EEC, BRA
BRA, ROW 56 4.68 1,981 USA, JPN, EEC, FSU
FSU, BRA, ROW 60 5.05 2,131 USA, JPN, EEC
with other regions because of relatively high marginal benefits. Moreover, they have a strong
incentive to form a coalition with regions that have a flat marginal abatement cost curve as for
instance CHN. However, such a coalition would not be internally stable because it violates
the interests of CHN.12 Also, EET are no member of an internally stable coalition and do not
wish to join one because their free-rider incentives are higher than those of other regions.
4. Results: sensitivity analyses and extension to transfers
A typical feature of empirical work is that results depend on parameter values, which are
subject to some uncertainty. Given the large number of parameters that enter our model, some
selection is necessary. From the discussion in section 3, it became evident that in particular
the estimation of benefits from global abatement is associated with large uncertainty. In our
model, this concerns the level parameter γD that applies to all countries and expresses global
benefits as reduction of global damages in terms of GDP and the shares of global benefits
of individual regions, si . Hence, we conduct the following sets of sensitivity analyses. The
first set of sensitivity analyses assumes the same regional shares si as in the base case (Cal-
ibration I) but lower or higher values of γD . Note that this sensitivity analysis can also be
interpreted as a change of the discount factor as a higher discount factor works similar to
12 The incentives to leave the coalition of USA, JPN, the EEC and CHN are negative for the first three regions
(−49, −103 and −163 billion US$, respectively), but highly positive for China (610 billion US$); note that
no other region would like to join this coalition – it is externally stable.
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Table 6 Sensitivity analysis for calibration I*
Benefits Coalitions Total Annual emission Total Total benefits Payoff
(%) emission reduction abatement from
reduction costs abatement
Gton (over percentage billion US$ billion US$ billion US$
100 of emissions in over 100 over 100 over 100
years) 2010 years years years
50 All Singletons 34 2.9 36 644 608
Grand Coalition 172 14.4 1,225 3,211 1,986
100 All Singletons 55 4.6 109 2,069 1,960
Grand Coalition 256 21.4 3,553 9,584 6,031
120 All Singletons 62 5.2 145 2,801 2,655
Coalition JPN, EEC 67 5.6 203 2,988 2,784
Grand Coalition 284 23.8 4693 12,746 8,053
The All Singletons Coalition Structure is stable by definition (see section 2); the Grand Coalition is not stable
in any of the scenarios; the coalition of JPN and the EEC is only stable for benefits 120% and above; benefits
100% = base case.
lower global damages and hence lower benefits from abatement.13 The second set assumes
the same value of γD as in the base case, but considers different regional benefit shares as
listed under Calibration II in Table 1.
Third, results of a model version that considers transfers are presented. We opt for a transfer
scheme based on grandfathering of emission rights and focus on the influence of introducing
transfers on the stability and characteristics of various coalition structures; this means we
leave the comparison of different transfer schemes to another paper (Weikard et al. 2004).
4.1. First set of sensitivity analyses (Calibration I)
In the base case, we assumed γD = 0.027 to which we refer now as “benefits 100%”. We
start our sensitivity analysis by lowering global benefits to 50% compared to the base case
that implies γD = 0.0135; this is almost equal to the value of the DICE model (Nordhaus
1994). We find no stable (non-trivial) coalition structure in this case as indicated in Table 6.
The lower benefits imply lower emission reductions (a reduction from 55 to 34 Gton in the
All Singletons Coalition Structure), though this relation is clearly non-linear (due to the
non-linear abatement cost function). The impact of lower benefits on global payoffs is a
combination of the direct impact of the lower benefits and the indirect impact through lower
emission reductions.
Subsequently, we raise benefits gradually. This leads to a stable coalition between JPN and
the EEC at a level of 120%. Interestingly, in this case, internally stable coalition structures
are the same as those listed in Table 5, except that JPN and the EEC also form an internally
stable coalition, which is also externally stable. Recalling our discussion in section 3, this is
not surprising. First, in the Grand Coalition Structure and the Industrialized Countries Coa-
lition Structure these were the only two regions that had no incentive to leave their coalition
(see Tables 3 and 4). Second, JPN and the EEC had a low free-rider incentive. However, the
coalition of JPN and the EEC only marginally improves upon the Singleton Case as is evident
13 This can be seen from equation (1): under stationary abatement strategies and in the absence of techno-
logical progress, the abatement costs are constant over time. In contrast, benefits are increasing over time, as
the stock of CO2 grows. Consequently, a lower global damage parameter scales down the net present value
of benefits and thus payoffs. A higher discount rate gives less emphasis on future periods, i.e., periods with
relatively high benefits, and thus also scales down the net present value of payoffs.
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from Table 6. This is not only because the coalition is small in size, but also because these
two regions have a low free-rider incentive index and thus will choose only very moderate
abatement targets (as marginal abatement costs are relatively high compared to marginal
benefits).
We also compute scenarios where we raise benefits to 200 and 300%, respectively, but no
major changes occur.
Summarizing the results of this first sensitivity analysis, we can conclude the following.
First, if there are stable coalitions they will be rather small, confirming the results of Barrett
(1994, 1997), and Hoel (1992). Second, the analysis of free-rider incentives helps to explain
membership in stable coalition structures: if there are stable coalitions, they will be formed
among regions with a similar incentive structure. Moreover, it is likely that only coalitions
with low abatement targets are stable since otherwise the free-rider incentive would become
too strong. Third, our results are in line with a conclusion obtained by Barrett (1994) for
symmetric regions: whenever the relative difference between no cooperation and full coop-
eration is large, stable coalitions (partial cooperation) achieve only little. For all scenarios,
the global payoff in the All Singletons Coalition Structure is roughly one third of that in
the Grand Coalition Structure – a large difference – and a stable coalition closes this gap
only by a very small amount. Interestingly, the ratio between the All Singletons Coalition
Structure and the Grand Coalition Structure in terms of the global payoff rises slightly from
30.6% in the 50% benefit scenario to 32.9% in the 120% benefit scenario, reaching 35.9%
in the 300% benefit scenario. Thus, when the difference between no and full cooperation is
particular large, no stable (non-trivial) coalition exists. Only when this difference becomes
small enough may partial cooperation be stable. Fourth, we can expect stable coalitions only
if benefits from emission reduction receive sufficient weight – a result that conforms with
intuition. Fifth, membership in stable coalition structures is very robust with respect to the
level of global benefits, and hence also with respect to the discount rate.
4.2. Second set of sensitivity analyses (Calibration II)
Here we assume the level of global benefits at 100% as in the base case but consider different
regional shares of benefits, as listed in Table 1 under Calibration II. For this run, we find the
results displayed in Table 7.
Table 7 largely confirms our previous findings. Whereas the previous sensitivity analysis
showed that, in our model, stability of coalition structures is very robust to changes in the
level of global beneﬁts from abatement, it is now shown that it is sensitive to regional shares
Table 7 Sensitivity analysis for Calibration II
Coalitions Total Annual emission Total Total benefits Payoff
emission reduction abatement from abatement
reduction costs
Gton (over percentage of billion US$ billion US$ billion US$
100 emissions in 100 over 100 over 100 over
years) 2010 years years years
All Singletons 54 4.5 93 2,013 1,920
Coalition JPN, BRA, ROW 58 4.9 141 2,178 2,037
Industrialized countries 89 7.5 346 3,345 2,999
coalition
Grand Coalition 256 21.4 3,553 9,584 6,031
The All Singletons Coalition Structure is stable by definition (see section 2); the Grand Coalition and Indus-
trialized Countries Coalition Structures are not stable; a coalition of JPN, BRA and ROW is the only stable
non-trivial coalition structure.
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Table 8 Results for the model with transfers
Coalitions Total emission Annual emission Payoff
reduction reduction
Gton (over 100 % of billion US$ over 100
years) emissions in 2010 years
All Singletonsa 55 4.6 1,960
Coalition EET, BRAb 56 4.7 1,981
Coalition CHN, BRAb 58 4.8 2,059
Coalition USA, EET, EEX, CHNc 103 8.6 3,418
Grand Coalitiond 256 21.4 6,031
a All Singletons Coalition Structure is stable by definition (see section 2)
b Stable coalitions under transfer rule 2
c Stable coalitions under transfer rule 1
d The Grand Coalition Structure is not stable under any rule
of benefits. Even though numerical estimates of regional damages due to climate change are
still scarce, especially for non-OECD countries, these regional estimates play an important
role in the incentive structure of regions in the negotiations of an IEA.
4.3. Extension of the model to include monetary transfers
In this subsection, we consider the impact of transfers for the success of coalition formation.
The analysis assumes the base case, i.e., Calibration I and γD = 0.027 (100% benefits).
Transfers are implemented such that every coalition member in the coalition receives the
payoff in the All-Singletons Coalition Structure plus a share of the surplus from cooperation.
Since the surplus is always positive in our global emission game, this scheme ensures profit-
ability to all coalition members. Hence, a necessary condition for stability is always satisfied.
Recall this condition may be violated without transfers as was demonstrated for the Grand
Coalition Structure in subsection 3.3 and for the Industrialized Countries Coalition Structure
in subsection 3.4. However, since profitability is not a sufficient condition for stability, sta-
bility will depend on the shares of the surplus. Obviously, there are many possibilities how
the regional shares for the distribution of the surplus can be chosen. We restrict attention to
only two assumptions that are sufficient to make the following three points: (a) Transfers can
improve upon the success of coalition formation, (b) Success crucially depends on regional
surplus shares, (c) Choosing regional shares based on moral motives may not always be a
good guide for effective treaty-making.
The first transfer scheme assumes regional surplus shares in relation to historical emis-
sions. That is, the higher historical emissions are, the higher the regional share of a region will
be. This is a version of the grandfathering rule; shares represent the status quo which may be
seen as a pragmatic allocation rule. The second transfer scheme assumes shares in relation
to historical responsibility for emissions. This is a version of a morally motivated transfer
scheme which allocates the surplus inversely to historical emissions. Thus, transfer scheme 1
favors high current emitters and for transfer scheme 2 just the opposite holds. For simplicity,
we use emission levels in 2010 as given in Table 1 in order to compute surplus shares. From
Table 1, it is evident that USA but also CHN and EEX have relative high current emissions
whereas BRA, DAE, JPN and ROW have low emissions. Table 8 presents the results when
computing stable coalition structures for the extended model with transfers.
From Table 8, it is evident that the two transfer schemes lead to very different stable
coalition structures in terms of membership and in terms of overall success. The two transfer
schemes represent two “corners of the playing field”. Transfers scheme 1 leads to a stable
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coalition of USA, EET, EEX and CHN, which is among the stable coalitions the one with the
highest global payoff and emission reduction, whereas transfer scheme 2 leads to a stable coa-
lition of EET and BRA and a stable coalition of CHN and BRA, but these coalitions achieve
only very little emission reduction and a low global payoff. Both transfer schemes improve
upon the All Singleton Coalition Structure. However, in the case of transfer scheme 2, the
improvement is only marginal. In contrast, in the case of transfer scheme 1, the improvement
is substantial though far from first best. Thus, transfers can partially mitigate free-riding but
cannot fully overcome stability problems. The morally motivated transfer scheme 2 implies
large transfers from the industrialized countries to countries in transition and developing
countries. Because these transfers are so pronounced, they make participation for industri-
alized countries unattractive. This is different for the pragmatic transfer scheme 1 which
leads to a less asymmetric allocation of the gains from cooperation. This implies a stable
coalition with four members. This coalition is relatively successful because not only CHN
as a producer of cheap abatement finds it attractive to participate in cooperation but also the
USA as a second key player.
Thus, the results clearly indicate the importance of transfers in general and the design of
transfers in particular for the success of climate agreements. Moreover, they provide some
rational for the grandfathering rule that is frequently mentioned in the policy debate. Though
this rule may not satisfy the criteria of a “fair” surplus sharing rule, it addresses the main
free-rider incentives in climate change. It implies moderate transfers from the main benefi-
ciaries to the main contributors in the context of an efficient climate policy, thereby balancing
different interests.
5. Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we studied stability of climate change coalitions in a cartel formation game,
applying the concept of internally and externally stable coalition structures. Although sub-
stantial improvements can be made with respect to the empirical calibration of the model, the
approach presented in this paper provides many relevant results and interpretations of which
we would like to mention six.
First, the gains from cooperation that are at stake in the case of global warming are large
according to our model. This is not only true for the absolute amount of global net benefits in
the global optimum (Grand Coalition Structure) but also when this number is put in perspec-
tive to net benefits in the Nash equilibrium (All Singleton Coalition Structure). Second, neither
the grand coalition nor the coalition of industrialized countries that we labeled “Industrialized
Countries Coalition” are stable for all parameter scenarios that we considered. Moreover, it
turned out that the USA conducts a considerable amount of abatement already as a singleton
and has an incentive to leave the Grand Coalition and the Industrialized Countries Coalition.
This result provided some rationale for the general difficulties of ratifying the Kyoto Proto-
col, the withdrawal of the USA and the reluctance of developing countries to participate in
a climate agreement. However, we found that the coalition of industrialized countries would
imply a non-negligible improvement compared to a situation without cooperation, though
it is clearly inferior to full cooperation. Third, stable non-trivial coalitions emerge only if
benefits from global abatement reach a sufficiently high level, or if appropriate transfers
are introduced. This suggests that stable cooperation can only be expected if the impact of
greenhouse gases receives sufficient attention by governments, or if transfers are part of an
international agreement. The regions that are expected to form a stable coalition are JPN and
the EEC, or under transfers USA, CHN, EET and EEX. Fourth, if there are stable coalitions,
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then they are small and only marginally improve upon the Nash equilibrium in terms of global
welfare, global emissions and concentrations. But if transfer schemes are introduced, larger
coalitions can become stable that may contribute substantially to emission reduction. Fifth,
membership in stable coalitions can be rationalized by investigating free-rider incentives. It
turned out that only regions with similar free-rider incentives form stable coalitions. Those
coalitions are stable because members have a sufficiently homogenous cost-benefit structure.
This result could help to explain why developing countries have not agreed upon reduction
targets in the Kyoto Protocol so far and that without transfer payments this will most likely not
change. Sixth, our results are very robust in terms of the level of benefits from global abate-
ment but are sensitive in terms of the regional distribution of benefits and the transfer schemes
applied.
Overall, we conclude that the prospects for stable and effective IEAs are not very positive
from the perspective of game theory. However, the paper demonstrated two main possibil-
ities that may help to improve upon the current situation. First, we showed that a stronger
recognition of the benefits from a joint environmental policy fosters the incentive for stable
cooperation. For this it is important that more research on the negative impacts of global
warming is conducted and that this information disseminates not only to the scientific com-
munity but also to a broader public. This will raise the consciousness for the global warming
problem and will initiate a stronger pressure by environmental groups on governments to
strive for stricter regulation and for more cooperation. Second, it became apparent that trans-
fer payments can lead to more stable and successful cooperation. We demonstrated that
the success of a transfers scheme crucially depends on its design. For an “optimal design”,
we showed that three issues are important. (a) Defining and capturing the interests of the
different players at stake. (b) Identifying the key players in climate change, i.e., the main
potential beneficiaries and the main potential contributors to a climate agreement. (c) Design-
ing a transfer scheme that sufficiently balances the heterogeneous interests between various
groups without favoring one group too much. As we have shown, it is not sufficient to
implement a transfer scheme that appears to be fair if this violates the interest of key play-
ers. The global nature of the climate problem and the heterogeneous interests world wide
clearly suggests that future research should give much attention to the design of transfers
schemes in order to mitigate the free-rider problem. This applies not only to direct trans-
fers as modeled in this paper, but also to indirect transfers as for instance implied by the
policy instruments of the Kyoto Protocol which includes permit trading, clean development
mechanism and joint implementation. For these activities, it will important to strengthen the
role of international organizations like the United Nations with its Environmental Program
(UNEP) or the scientific committee IPCC (International Panel of Climate Change), not only
to gain more insights and to develop policy measures but also to achieve more consensus
about these insights and measures. We believe this will be an important step in broaden-
ing the current climate coalition and to induce the participants to accept higher abatement
targets.
Appendix: details on the calibration of the STACO model
A.1. Concentrations of greenhouse gases
For the development of the stock of carbon dioxide in the BAU-scenario, we base our calibra-
tion on the market scenario in the DICE model (Nordhaus 1994). This scenario assumes no
emission reduction, though there is a feedback between the environment and the economy.
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In our analysis, we focus on carbon dioxide, but the exogenous level of other greenhouse
gases is included in the calibration of the damage cost function.
The stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at time t is expressed by the following
equation (following DICE):
Mt (q2011, . . . , qt ) = Mpre-ind + (1 − δ)(t−2010) ·
(
M2010 − Mpre-ind
)
+
t∑
s=2011
(
(1 − δ)t−s · ω · (es − qs)
) (2)
That is, the stock, Mt , at time t depends on global abatement from time t = 2011 onwards,
q2011, q2012, . . ., qt where qt = ∑Ni=1 qit . More specifically, the stock depends on three terms.
The first term is the pre-industrial stock, Mpre-ind, which is 590 Gton CO2 according to DICE.
This stock remains constant over time and may be interpreted as the “natural equilibrium”.
The second term is the stock in 2010 in excess of the pre-industrial stock that decays with a
rate δ per annum. The “natural removal or decay rate” as well as the stock in 2010 are taken
from DICE and are δ = 0.00866 and M2010 = 835 Gton CO2, respectively. The third term
describes how global (BAU) emissions es , minus global abatement after 2010, qs contribute
to the stock in year t. The BAU-emissions are calibrated such that the stock of carbon dioxide
without abatement mirrors the development of the stock in the market scenario of DICE. The
airborne fraction of total net emissions (BAU-emissions minus abatement) that remains in
the atmosphere is 64% (ω = 0.64) according to DICE.
In the game-theoretical setting of the model we assume stationary abatement strategies,
which implies that annual emission reduction, qt = q/100, is constant once the emission
reduction strategy has been chosen.
A.2. Calibration of the benefits from abatement
In DICE, damages are linked to concentrations in a climate module, such that global damages
depend on world temperature increase. However, in order to establish a direct link between
concentrations and damages, we follow Germain and van Steenberghe (2001), who approxi-
mate the full climate module by linking temperature increases to the stock of carbon dioxide.
Thus, we can write14
Dt =
(γD
9
)
·
[
η · ln
(
Mt
Mpre-ind
)]2
· Yt (3)
where parameter γD measures the impact on GDP due to an increase in temperature of 3
degrees Celsius compared to the pre-industrial level, η is a scaling parameter used in the
approximation of the full climate module15 and Yt denotes global GDP in year t .
Though this damage function is non-linear, it can be approximated by a linear function in
the relevant range of our study, that is, between the stock in 2010 (1.4 times pre-industrial
level) and the estimated uncontrolled level in 2110 (3.5 times pre-industrial level):
Dt =
[
γ1 + γ2 ·
(
Mt
Mpre-ind
)]
· (γD · Yt ) (4)
14 All market values are expressed in billion US$ of 1985 using the deflator provided by NASA (2002). This
applies to damages, benefits and abatement costs.
15 This includes an exogenous additional impact of other greenhouse gases on radiative forcing (see Nordhaus
(1994).
Economics of Governance (2006) 7:271–291 289
Table 9 Parameter values
Symbol Description Value Unit Source
e2010 Global emissions in 2010 11.96 Gton CO2 Nordhaus (1994)
ei,2010 Regional emissions in see Table 1 Gton CO2 Own calculation
year 2010 in section 3 based on
Ellerman and Decaux (1998)
dE Annual absolute growth 0.153 Gton CO2 Own calculation
in global and regional based on
emissions in BAU-scenario
Nordhaus (1994)
Mpre-ind Pre-industrial level of 590 Gton CO2 Nordhaus (1994)
CO2-stock
M2010 Stock of CO2 in 2010 835 Gton CO2 Nordhaus (1994)
δ Natural annual removal or 0.00866 – Nordhaus (1994)
decay rate of CO2-stock
ω Airborne fraction of 0.64 Nordhaus (1994)
emissions that remain
in the atmosphere
r Annual uniform 0.02 – Assumption
discount rate
si Share of see Table 1 – Own calculation
region i in global benefits in section 3 based on
Fankhauser (1995)
and Tol (1997)
αi , βi Abatement cost see Table 1 – Own calculation
parameters of region i in section 3 based on
Ellerman and Decaux (1998)
Mno-effect No-effect level of 786 Gton Own calculation
CO2 stock for
damage function
ϕ Slope of damage and 178.331 Billion US$ Own calculation
benefit function per Gton
γD Scale parameter of damage 0.027 – Tol (1997)
and benefit function
where γ1 and γ2 are calculated via OLS-regression.16 As the stock of carbon dioxide (cf. (2))
is linear in abatement under stationary reduction strategies, damages as specified in (4) are
also linear in abatement.
A.3. Calibration of the abatement costs
For the specification of the abatement cost function, we rely on estimates of the EPPA model
that are reported in Ellerman and Decaux (1998). They assume an annual abatement cost
function of the following form:
ACit (qit ) = 13 · αi · (qit )3 + 12 · βi · (qit )2 (5)
We can use their estimates but have to adjust their figures in three respects. First, we have to
account for the fact that their abatement cost estimates are in million US$ per megaton green-
house gas reduction whereas our unit of measurement is billion US$ per gigaton. Second,
we replace qit by qi/100 because we assume stationary strategies (qi,2011 = · · · = qi,2110).
Third, they estimate a negative value for the parameter αi for OOE. Since this would cause
16 Given our interpretation of γD , damages equal to γDYt for doubling of concentrations. Hence, we can
impose γ1 = 1 − 2 · γ2 and estimate γ2. OLS gives γ2 = 1.497 with standard error 0.011 (t value: 136.2) and
adjusted R2 = 0.998, indicating an almost perfect fit.
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problems for computations, we set αi = 0 in this case and re-estimate βi for OOE. All
estimates are displayed in the last two columns in Table 1.
In order to derive total abatement costs of region i , T ACi (qi ), we discount and sum
discounted abatement costs over time: TACi (qi ) = ∑2110t=2011(1 + r)−(t−2010)ACi t (qi ). This
implies that we assume the same abatement cost structure throughout, neglecting possible
exogenous or endogenous cost efficiency effects.
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